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Abstract 
 
Following the EU policy oriented to implement a tolling system based on social 
marginal costs, Spain is studying the implementation of an interurban road pricing 
scheme. In particular, a main result from the Spanish Road Pricing Model suggests that 
a road pricing scheme based on the congestion costs makes sense only in the reduced 
number of metropolitan highways and can be used to manage the travel demand in an 
urban and metropolitan context. In consequence, the analysis of this paper is focused on 
the results of the simulation of a toll-ring defined as a combined toll (access and 
distance toll based scheme) applied on the one of the more congested ring of the Madrid 
Metropolitan Area, the M40. The results are analyzed in terms of efficiency and equity 
criteria. Finally, the results of the implementation of a toll-ring pricing policy show a 
clear increasing level of socio-spatial inequalities. In fact, when the users have a viable 
road alternative, the burden of the toll-ring is equally distributed, if not, the burden of 
toll ring affects more the less wealthy people.    
 
 
INTRODUCTION: ROAD PRICING STRATEGY TO INTERNALIZE 
CONGESTION COSTS 
 
Among the interurban road pricing policies, the metropolitan road tolling policies need 
to be differently analyzed because of its specific characteristics. In fact, the urban and 
metropolitan areas intercept most of the daily journeys which contribute to congestion 
and which are very sensible to the toll because of their daily frequency.  
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Following the EU policy (Towards fair and efficient pricing in Transport, 1996) 
oriented to implement a tolling system based on social marginal costs, Spain is studying 
the implementation of an interurban road pricing scheme (Di Ciommo, Monzón and 
Fernandez, 2010). A starting point is that prices should reflect the marginal social cost 
imposed on society by consumption of the good (v-km travelled). When car users 
decide to travel additional kilometres they impose additional costs (Nash, 2007): 
 
• on themselves (operating and time costs) 
• on the infrastructure-provider (maintenance and operation costs)  
• on other users (delay and congestion cost)  
• on the rest of society (accident, climate change, pollution and noise).  
 
Costs to other users and to the rest of society are referred to as external costs. These 
costs, specially the congestion costs, in general, are higher in the metropolitan areas 
than in the other areas.  
  
A main result from the Spanish Road Pricing Model (META, 2007) in terms of policy 
implications suggests that a road pricing scheme based on the congestion costs makes 
sense only in the reduced number of metropolitan highways and can be used to manage 
the travel demand in an urban and metropolitan context, like the Madrid Metropolitan 
Area. 
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate how internalize a congestion cost by a toll-ring 
scheme in a metropolitan area like Madrid. In particular, the analysis is focused on the 
results of the simulation of a toll-ring defined as a combined toll (access and distance 
toll based scheme) applied on the one of the more congested ring, the M40. The results 
are analyzed in terms of efficiency and equity criteria. 
 
 
MADRID MOBILITY PATTERNS AND SPRAWLS PROCESS 
 
Madrid is experimenting an intensive sprawling process. During the last fifty years, 
Madrid changes its urban organization: from a monocentric city became a policentric 
metropolis. The metropolitan bounds of Madrid enlarged including an higher population 
in respect of the municipality of the city center. If the population of Madrid multiplies 
itself for 1,9 during the last 60 years, the Madrid Metropolitan Area (MMA) multiplied 
that for 26,1. The current demographic evolution shows that the municipality of the city 
center looses population: its demographic weight in respect of the metropolitan area 
changes from 65% to 52% between 1985 and 2006. Considering the demographic 
density in the new suburbs, the new metropolitan periphery is characterized by a lower 
residential density, produced by a dispersed  residential  zone and a fragmented urban 
landscape. In this context, the urban land increased much more than the population. Up 
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to now, measures intended to channel or direct such urban sprawl have rarely been 
applied (Monzón and De la Hoz, 2009).  
 
In the MMA, the car ownership rate is almost 550 per 1,000 inhabitants, which is the 
highest motorization rate among the Spanish regions. The phenomenon of the 
suburbanization of both residence and employment along with the increase of car 
ownership is prompting new transportation trends in the MMA, increasing the 
congestion phenomena especially on the metropolitan rings of M40 and M30 during the 
peak hours. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Madrid Metropolitan Area, city center and rings location. 
 
The mobility survey developed on the Madrid Metropolitan Area shows that from 1996 
to 2004 the number of mechanized trips increased by 52%, whereas the population 
increased only by 14%. An efficient way to manage the increasing car travel demand 
could be the implementation of a metropolitan toll in the more congested road sections, 
associated with an urban planning policy. 
MMA 
N
M40 
M30 
City Center 
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INTERNALIZING EXTERNAL COSTS BY A CONGESTION PRICING 
STRATEGY IN THE MMA 
 
The evaluation of internal and external cost is an essential and effective way to charge 
road users. Economic theory suggests social marginal cost pricing as the optimal pricing 
principle for charging the use of transport infrastructure, especially in the metropolitan 
areas. 
 
The Spanish road pricing model (META, 2010) has developed an easy-to-apply pricing 
methodology, based on a bottom-up approach. The main variable is the AADT 
(Average Annual Daily Traffic, daily flow) applied to accurately estimate generalized 
road transport costs for each kind of vehicle and each type of road. Based on the current 
Spanish road network, the META model estimates all social costs: internal costs (fuel, 
vehicle maintenance, labor, insurance and tax) and external costs (infrastructure, 
congestion, accident and environmental nuisances). Computed for the 13,156 km of 
interurban highways network, the model calculates the costs for each vehicle type (Car, 
HGV, LGV and bus) and for each road network section following the interurban road 
characteristics (AADT, capacity and traffic composition for each section of highway 
network).  
 
The two main results of META model for costs in terms of policy implications suggest 
to moderate the construction of new interurban road infrastructures in Spain and to 
analyze congestion before building new metropolitan roads (Di Ciommo et al. 2010). A 
road pricing scheme based on congestion costs makes sense only in the reduced number 
of metropolitan highways and can be used to manage the travel demand in an urban and 
metropolitan context. In this case, the marginal costs can be the principle to define a 
congestion road pricing like a toll-ring in MMA (Inge et al. 1996). The aim of a cost 
model is to estimate the external costs produced by the road users and to assign them 
with a cost equivalent charge. Consequently, it is necessary to consider a formulation 
that allows assessing the total, average, and marginal costs in order to establish the most 
adequate toll to internalize the externalities produced by road traffic. The applied 
methodology defines the total cost function (CT), which is expressed depending on the 
hourly traffic flow. Initially, 4 different vehicle categories were considered (a standard 
private vehicle with a 2 liter engine I1 , an 18tons bus for passenger transportation I2,  
an 18-20 tons rigid truck, I3, and articulated heavy vehicle for freight transportation, 
I4). The final expression for the total costs in euro per vehicle-km is given by: 
 ( )4321 ,,, IIIICC TT =         (1) 
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The external costs derived from road traffic can be classified according to their nature as 
congestion costs, environmental costs (noise, climate change, pollution), costs of 
accidents and, in some cases, infrastructure (CE Delft, 2008). The final road traffic 
social cost function is an additive function of these costs: 
 
TATENVTIcongTOT CCCCCC ++++=      (2) 
 
TOC  Operation costs (fuel consumption and travel time) 
congC  Congestion cost: travel time cost and additional consumption costs during 
congestion  
TIC  Maintenance and operation costs for infrastructure 
TENVC  Environmental costs (CO2, atmospheric pollution and noise costs) 
TAC  Costs of accidents 
 
The marginal external cost, for each kind of vehicle, is obtained deriving the total 
external costs function: 
( )
1
4321
1
,,,'
I
IIIICC T ∂
∂=
 
(3) 
In this paper, we mainly focus on the congestion costs that represent mainly the 
difference between internal and social marginal costs. These costs represent the basis 
for a toll-ring scheme in a metropolitan area and we use the average operation costs and 
the congestion costs estimated by the META model in the travel demand simulation 
model.  
 
One of the most popular “congestion pricing policies” is the toll-ring scheme used in 
Oslo (such as Trondheim and Bergen) and in Stockholm, where the vehicles are taxed 
when entering or exiting the city centre, especially during peak periods. In fact, a toll-
ring scheme discourages orbital diversions, achieving higher efficiency and 
environmental benefits. 
 
 
CONGESTION PRICING: A TOLL RING SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION 
 
A combined toll based on an access and distance scheme is simulated in the 
metropolitan highway M40 during the peak hour (8-9 a.m.). 
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M-40 is the main metropolitan ring looping surrounding Madrid; with a total length of 
63.3 km, looping around the city at a mean distance of 10.1 km to the city center. 
Furthermore, it is the only one of the several ring roads serving Madrid that runs as a 
full-fledged motorway for all its length (the inner ring, M-30, has a span about 2 km 
long at the northern arc that are not freeway-grade, having level crossings and traffic 
lights, and M-45 and M-50 are not complete rings). Some road sections of the M40 
represent the most congested in Spain, like showed by META. In consequence, we set 
up the toll in all the links of entrance to the inner ring delimited by M40 and the links of 
the M40 as well. The combined access and distance based scheme is estimated around 
1.0€+0.1€/veh-km: 1.0€ represents the entrance to the inner ring and 0.1€/veh-km is the 
toll based on the travelled distance. 
 
 
TOLL RING SCHEME EFFECTS ON CONGESTION  
 
The following tables shows the results of the simulation obtained from VISUM in terms 
of traffic volume (v-km) and current travel speed of the whole network, the M30 and 
M40 rings, and the city center, respectively. 
 
Table I- Hourly traffic volume and average speed in the reference and toll-ring scenarios 
Affected 
roads or city 
areas 
Reference scenario: without toll Toll-ring scenario:  with toll 
Traffic flow 
(1000 v-km) 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Traffic flow 
(1000 v-km) 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Total 
Network  6,516 42 6,529 42 
M40 728 57 649 70 
M30 363 55 370 54 
City Center 29 37 29 37 
 
 
Analyzing these results, we remark a clear melioration in the M40 (70 km/h in the Toll-
ring scenario versus 57 km/h in the reference scenario), without a real prejudgment for 
the other road ring (M30) and the city center. The travel demand model used for this toll 
simulation considers only the private car traffic: in other words the travellers cannot 
change their mode choice, neither the travel time. So the whole network traffic volume 
and current speed retain whatever with toll or not. 
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From Table I, firstly we could see the hourly traffic volume and travel speed changed 
significantly in the tolled area. The traffic volume decreases 11% in the M40 and the 
travel speed increase 23%, without affecting the traffic flow in the M30.  
 
 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY ANALYSIS ON SELECTED ROAD SECTIONS 
OF M40 
 
To realize an analysis in terms of the efficiency and equity terms, we compare the 
congestion pricing simulation in two different road sections located in the south and 
north of M40, like showed by the Figure 2. In this way, we can analyze the influence of 
the metropolitan toll in different areas of Madrid.  
 
We present the information of traffic volume, current travel speed and impedance in 
road a representative section located in the north of M40, and a representative section 
located in the south. Two kinds of analysis have been done, one is centred on demand 
variation analysis; the other is done in terms of the equity impact analyzing the income 
distribution of the users of the two different road sections (Viegas, J.M. ,2001).  
 
The adopted criteria to select the two road sections to compare the efficiency and the 
equity effects are basically four: 
 
1. both road sections of the M40 are congested  
2. the socio-economic environment is different: wealthy in the north and 
poor in the south. 
3. road alternatives to M40 are different: while in the north section the only 
other ring is M30, for the south section, there also exist M45 and M50, 
which are uncompleted rings surrounding Madrid. 
4. an important quantitative difference characterizes the traffic flow with 
and without toll.  
Table II - Characteristics of two selected road sections in the M40 ring 
Section 
Reference scenario: 
without toll 
Toll-ring scenario:  
with toll 
Traffic flow 
(veh-km) 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Traffic flow 
(veh-km) 
Speed 
(km/h) 
North 
section 
Way 1 8,408 23 8,280 25 
Way 2 3,122 80 2,413 80 
Both ways 11,530 51.5 10,693 52.5 
South 
section 
Way 1 6,285 29 5,839 45 
Way 2 6,048 37 5,023 78 
Both ways 12,333 33 10,862 61.5 
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Figure 2 – Selected sections with traffic volume. 
 
In the toll-ring scenario, we explored different levels of toll to see how this road pricing 
scheme influenced the traffic volume. The result in terms of the efficiency of different 
toll levels is: increasing 2 or 3 times the variable part of the toll fee, the traffic volume 
decreased more than 2 or 3 times. In other words, the traffic flow is very sensitive in 
respect of the toll changing.  
 
 
Table III – Sensitivity analysis on price level 
Toll values M40 South Road section  North Road section 
1.0 € + 0.1 €/vkm 11% 12% 7% 
1.0 € +0.2 €/vkm 24% 31% 11% 
1.0 € +0.3 €/vkm 38% 53% 15% 
 
South Section 
North Section
N 
M40 
M30 
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Comparing South and North sections, the results show that the road section located in 
the South of M40 is much more influenced by the toll, the demand decreases of 31% by 
using 0.2 €/vkm and 53% by using 0.3 €/vkm because of the alternative metropolitan 
highways (M45 and M50, for example), while the variability of the demand variation in 
the North road section is lower, because of the less alternative roads.  
 
The objectives more commonly pursued when implementing a pricing policy are: 
congestion reduction, improving the environment and generating revenue (May and 
Milne, 2000). However, there are other important aspects to consider, as urban sprawl 
or equity. This last one is considered by several authors as one of the main obstacles for 
citizen acceptability of the measure (Litman, T. 1996; Schlag, B. and Teubel, U. 1997; 
Link, H. 2007). 
 
Equity can be faced from numerous dimensions. One of the most common is the so 
called “vertical equity”, which can be seen as an unequal impact from the scheme across 
the different groups of the population segregated by income level, sex, available 
alternative to car, age, or even race (Sumalee, 2003). To this respect, users income level 
is one of the main variables considered in equity analysis. Foster (1974, 1975) was 
perhaps the first to argue that road pricing discriminates against the poor. 
 
One of the ways to mitigate this effect is to use the revenues obtained, at least partially, 
to improve the public transport system. In this way, it exists a transfer of income from 
higher income individual to lower income ones, which means, according to the Dalton 
principle, an equity improvement (Ramjerdi, 2006, Rietveld, 2003). 
 
It also exists the “horizontal equity”, or spatial equity, which can be described as the 
distribution of the benefits and costs of the scheme across the population from different 
areas in the network (Sumalee, 2003). 
 
From traditional economic equity analysis, there exists a notion of an index for income-
distribution which measures the distribution of income amongst the population. Several 
indexes have been proposed in the literature (Cowell, 1995). In transport, these 
measures have been occasionally adopted in the policy analysis. Vold (2005) adopted 
the Gini coefficient to evaluate the spatial equity impact of different transport policy 
packages using Kolm’s measure. Sumalee (2003) adopted the Gini coefficient to 
evaluate the spatial equity impact from different charging cordon design. In this paper, 
the Gini coefficient will be used to measure the equity effects from the same toll design, 
but different areas in the network.  
 
Given the structure of the socio-economic characteristics of MMA with a wealthy North 
and a poorer South of region, it is appropriate to evaluate the distribution of income 
amongst the users of the M40 according to their origin-destination, following the spatial 
equity analysis (Maruyama, T. and Sumalee, A., 2007) and, once categorized by their 
route choice after the congestion toll implementation, to examine the incidence of a 
congestion pricing policy on the income distribution, comparing the Gini index in the 
reference scenario and toll-ring scenario. 
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The Lorenz curve (distribution north and distribution south) is constructed by 
organizing the population (the M40 users who have their origin node in the north or in 
the south of the MMA) in an increasing order of their incomes and by assigning to each 
individual the proportion of total income earned by that individual. The Gini coefficient 
may be defined as the proportion between the area between the equality distribution and 
Lorenz curves and the area under the equality curve. The Gini coefficient thus takes the 
value between 0 and 1, in which Gini = 0 is the case with the perfect equitable situation.  
 
Comparing the two user situations in the two road sections, the Gini coefficient shows a 
similar situation in terms of income distribution before the congestion toll 
implementation. Therefore, after the toll-ring implementation, the Gini index shows an 
increasing evolution amongst the users of the northern road section. In other terms, in 
this area of the network, the burden of the congestion toll affects more the less wealthy 
population like showed in the figure 4, while in the south, the weight of the toll 
congestion is more equally distributed and the Gini coefficient is quite constant respect 
to the “ reference or do nothing scenario”.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Gini coefficient level for each road section selected with and without toll 
 
Finally, the results presented in table IV show a clear increasing level of socio-spatial 
inequalities. Categorizing the road users by their route choice, leaving the tolled M40, 
remaining users of the M40 or the new coming users of M40, after the toll-ring 
implementation, the incidence of a congestion pricing policy in the north affect more to 
low income users, especially the new coming users and the remaining users of the M40, 
while in the south the burden of the congestion pricing is quite equally distributed. 
These results are symmetric in respect of the Gini evolution. A deep analysis of the two 
different users population from the north and south of the M40 shows that even if the 
north population in general has a higher level of income, the lower income population 
localized in the north pays proportionally more for the congestion toll policy because 
they live far from the alternative route and they are obliged to take the M40. 
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Table IV- Toll-ring burden on the income of the M40 users during the peak-hour 
Road 
Section 
Annual Income 
Level 
New users AGC* Left users AGC Remain users 
AGC 
 
North 
Section 
Low-income 
(<12000) 
2071 1586 1908 
Middle-income 
(12000-18000) 
1139 1509 1394 
High-income 
(>18000) 
1090 986 971 
 
South 
Section 
Low-income 
(<12000) 
1046 1458 1089 
Middle-income 
(12000-18000) 
1093 1125 1055 
High-income 
(>18000) 
1425 1462 1353 
*Average generalized trip cost 
 
 
CONCLUSION:  THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY 
EFFECTS  
 
The results of the simulation in terms of efficiency effects and demand elasticity 
variation show that a congestion pricing policy like the implementation of a toll-ring has 
a deep incidence on the behaviour of the road users. If an increasing toll-ring produces a 
quite high variation of the travel demand with a demand elasticity reaching 53%, 
knowing that the incidence of the average operation costs linked to the introduction of 
the toll-ring is high (until 2,500 € by year), it is possible that in the long term the road 
users change their residential and socio-economic behaviour. A recentralization of the 
residential and economic activities could be possible inside of the ring of the M40. 
 
Finally, the implementation of a toll-ring to the M40 seems to be strategically chosen. 
On one side in the short term, we achieve the managing of the travel demand of a 
congested metropolitan ring; on the other side, in the long term, the travellers could 
change their residential and economic behaviour, localizing them self inside of the M40 
ring. In terms of efficiency, we could obtain a better situation. The problem remains in 
terms of equity effects: if the burden of the toll-ring in the north of the M40 is higher for 
the poorer people, it is necessary to see if they can or cannot choose an M40 inside 
residence. If they have choice, a short inequity effects can be compensated by a long 
term residential recentralization. If it is not the case, the implementation of a toll ring 
scheme can increase the inequality income distribution, especially in the north of the 
M40.  
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